Question for Vietnam Vets

[Major Tom]

When did you first realize that the 'war' was wrong?
I was sent to 'Nam in July 1966 when the troop built up was going strong. When I got there, there were about 180,000 troops.
First hand knowledge of incompetant doings came early. The politicians would not allow our troops to do anything that WW2 troops did. Halting the bombing of N. Vietnam was a slap in the grunts face as they were fighting and dieing just for "body counts". We couldn't return fire in several locations because of "civilian casualties". Arvin troops, except for a very few. were useless. High ranking guys were getting medals and promotions just for showing up after a major battle.

[blackhawknj]

I never thought it was "wrong", but it was badly fought, with the wrong people-LBJ and Macnamara in charge. Yes, for too many careerists it was just a way of punching their tickets and a way to accelerated promotions-"There's nothing like a chest full of ribbons and the old war record when the promotion board meets" to quote Anthony Herbert.

[Clark Howard]

What you say about too many field grade officers and rules of engagement are correct. The real combat was handled by company grade officers, while "supervised" by field grade officers, at a considerable distance. We were never allowed to strike the enemy where his war fighting ability would be degraded. Washington did not want to win, only to drag it out as long as possible to discourage Russian and Chinese support. All this said, we were killing communists on a large scale, and we were winning, when I left country. Regards, Clark

[JohnPeeff]

We must have been there at the same time!

[togor]

I'll ask the follow-up question: specifically, what would have won the war? I'll suggest nuking Hanoi would not be considered a realistic option.

[Major Tom]

I'll ask the follow-up question: specifically, what would have won the war? I'll suggest nuking Hanoi would not be considered a realistic option.

We should have never stopped bombing the North! By doing so it only let the North keep on supplying their troops in the South. Restricting our troops from returning fire was wrong too. As for Officers leading troops in the field, it was non-coms that lead their squads/platoon. Taking ground by troops and then giving same ground back to the VC and Northern troops was a waste of our casualties. While I was there, we ran into several U.S. contractors who were making big bucks while we had to defend them.

[togor]

I can't help but think geography doomed the Vietnam campaign from the start. The long Laotian border, the cover of the jungle, the low-tech logistics efforts of the Vietnamese. It would have required a huge number of boots on the ground, and for what? Regarding air-dropped ordnance, I thought I read that the amount dropped in Vietnam was already a good bit more than WW2. Korea is at least a peninsula in the south, so while technically part of the Asian land mass, it isn't smack on the Asian continent like Vietnam. It's just hard for me to see what enduring victory in Vietnam would look like.

[Vern Humphrey]

I never thought it was "wrong", but it was badly fought, with the wrong people-LBJ and Macnamara in charge. Yes, for too many careerists it was just a way of punching their tickets and a way to accelerated promotions-"There's nothing like a chest full of ribbons and the old war record when the promotion board meets" to quote Anthony Herbert.

You're right -- it was a war worth winning, but that wasn't permitted. MacNamara's strategy of "gradual escalation" was a disaster. And fighting in friendly territory was simply a losing strategy.

The best strategy would have been to invade North Viet Nam, crossing the Ben Hai River, and forcing the NVA into a set-piece battle, then landing a couple of divisions of Marines and an airborne division or two behind them and annihilating them.

[blackhawknj]

Vietnamization should have been started a lot sooner, in Korea by Summer 1953 3/4 of the front line was held by ROK units. Granted, we controlled the logistics to keep Syngman Rhee from launching his own offensives.
In Vietnam the decision was made in early 1964 NOT to have a joint US-ARVN command, partly to acknowledge their sensitivities, partly out of serious concerns over security-moles helped to undermine Chiang Kai-shek. However this led to a situation like that of the Axis in WWII-Mussolini's "Parallell War". High level staff talks between the Germans and the Italians were not started until May, 1943.
Vietnam started to go badly when the Army left behind its professional phase and entered its "careerist" phase. I read an account which described the visit of CSA General Harold Johnson to the commander of the 1st Infantry Division in late 1967. The purpose of General Johnson's visit was not to discuss tactics, strategy, equipment-morale-but to deal with complaints that the then commander was too quick to relieve subordinates who couldn't perform in combat and an assignment to that unit was a career wrecker.

[togor]

The best strategy would have been to invade North Viet Nam, crossing the Ben Hai River, and forcing the NVA into a set-piece battle, then landing a couple of divisions of Marines and an airborne division or two behind them and annihilating them.

Some sort of PLA response was no doubt on the minds of US planners. Mao had cadres to burn.