Low Number '03 catastrophic failure- recent.

[Texraid]

Looks like something very fishy in that data! Why would a 195 gr bullet start at 23 grains, a 200 gr bullet start at 21 grains... and then a 210 gr bullet jump to a whopping 28 grains?

That's what i was thinking after looking at Accurate's loading data.

Art

[psteinmayer]

Although I'm certainly no expert when it comes to bullet design and variances... I'm fairly sure that powder charge is based on bullet weight, so I believe that a 210 grain bullet is 210 grains, be it a Hornady, Nosler, Sierra... etc. The same should go for cast also, whether it's a Lyman, LEE, NOE, etc. 28 grains is one hell of a jump from 21, and (again, I'm not any kind of expert here) as far as I know, powder charges generally go down as bullet weight goes up. If I'm wrong about that, please let me know...

[Texraid]

Although I'm certainly no expert when it comes to bullet design and variances... I'm fairly sure that powder charge is based on bullet weight, so I believe that a 210 grain bullet is 210 grains, be it a Hornady, Nosler, Sierra... etc. The same should go for cast also, whether it's a Lyman, LEE, NOE, etc. 28 grains is one hell of a jump from 21, and (again, I'm not any kind of expert here) as far as I know, powder charges generally go down as bullet weight goes up. If I'm wrong about that, please let me know...

You are not wrong. Even if I/you are wrong, I can't fathom a 36% increase! That would be based on 18gr. IF that is correct.
I can't help but wonder if Lyman intended to print 18 instead of 28??? That would certainly be more in line for a starting load and would logically follow Accurate's factory load data.
Art

[BrentD]

Texraid,
Your habit of checking multiple sources is obviously a REALLY GOOD IDEA in hindsight. I don't know many sources that publish data for very many cast lead bullets, but clearly I need to find another one, if I'm to play with modern rifles like this.

[slamfire]

This is just another example of why it is best practice not to shoot these old rifles with any load at all. They are as a class: unsafe.

The Army was an Infantry centric organization and the knuckle draggers did not understand nor did they want to understand production problems and they were certainly not interesting in spending money on their Arsenals. Instead of fighting this, and scuttling any chances of promotion, I believe the Colonels in charge of Springfield Arsenal spent their tour drinking mint juleps between chukkers on the parade ground in front of Springfield Arsenal. I have seen pictures of these guys doing just that. The Army did not want to hear bad news and instead created fallacious stories that absolved them of all fault and responsibility when their single heat treat receivers blew. Since most of these guns blew up in a period when shooters greased bullets, the Army created the story that greased bullets, greased chambers were the cause, because by the process of elimination, it had to be the grease. Their perfect rifles were blowing with their perfect ammunition, so it had to be the grease. This is still believed by the vast majority of the shooting community, the dominate posters on this forum, and it is all bunk. The problem with single heat treat receivers was a combination of an old, antiqued factory with old antiquated equipment, an illogical production flow, and an organizational attitude where the hierarchy only wanted to hear good things. Workers in such organizations learn quickly that the bearer of bad news is not welcome, and if such a person is too persistent, management terminates them.

There are a number of issues with all of the single heat treat 03's. Firstly, the problem was not the heat treatment. The single heat treatment would have produced a perfectly satisfactory receiver, (caveat: for the period) but Army was negligent in buying instrumentation for their factories. Instead of buying pyrometers, workers were required to judge steel temperature based on their eyeballs. Eyeballs cannot hold the temperature tolerances required for heat treatment of those steels. Basically the workers were using Medieval production methods because it was cheaper, and the Army priorities were not keeping their Arsenals up to date. I am of the opinion it was more than benign neglect, it was a matter of Corporate Culture. According Dr Deiter Storz's book: Rifle & Carbine 98: M98 Firearms of the German Army from 1898 to 1918 Amberg Arsenal installed pyrometers in 1906. The German Technical staff and Managers recognized the limitations of eyeballs in heat treatment, that is they thought about it, and decided to improve their production line to make good rifles.

As an example of the improvement in duty lifetime when production lines were organized logically, and instrument used to evaluate temperature, instead of eyeballs, I offer this is book review from Jan 1926 Transactions of the American Society for Steel Treating.


Making Springs for Motor Vehicles
Canadian Machinery, 12 Nov 1925, page 15


The author of this paper discusses the benefits that have come to the manufacture of springs in the motor car industry from metallurgical research. Springs today stand four or five times the work of those a few year ago because the “skill” and “guessing” of the forger has been replaced by heat treating furnaces with temperatures maintained at the proper degree by pyrometers. The Dowsley Spring and Axle Co., Chatham, Ont., a subsidiary of the Ontario Products Co., is taken as an example of a thoroughly modern plant, and its work discussed. There are 145 men employed in the plant and production averages about 55 tons of springs a day, a single spring weighing anywhere from 17 to 44 pounds.

The plant is so arranged that material follows a straight path from storage to shipping room. Until a few years ago all springs were heat treated in small oil-fired furnaces. Today this method had been discarded. A continuous heat treating, forming, and quenching process has been evolved, which is practically automatic and eliminates the human element. As an example of what careful- heat treatment has done toward prolonging the life of springs, the results of test of springs made by the hand method and those by the continuous heat treatment method are interesting. Some years ago 40,0000 deflections were about the average before failure, now 120,000 is a low figure.

You can see in this the early vacuum tube era (1925) that a changeover from eyeballs to temperature gauges has really improved the fatigue lifetime of springs.


If the receiver was burnt, that is over heated during forging, it cannot be fixed by heat treating. Burning steel is not like burning toast but anyone with brains has noticed you cannot stick burnt toast back in the toaster and heat it back to fresh. Once ruined, it is ruined. Burnt steel is a fusion reaction, fusing the steel into one big austenite crystal. The desired crystalline structure is martensitic. But when steel is raised to a “white hot” temperature the steel is all in the austineitic phase. When it cools from this temperature it is a very hard, brittle steel. I have been told by metallurgists the carbon is burnt out. It is impossible to anneal or heat treat burnt steel back to a useable material. Long anneals will break up some of the hard areas, but not all. To make the steel useable it would have to be completed melted and cast again, as it is came from the steel foundry.


The single heat treat cycle was

Receivers and bolts of SA, serial number 1 to 800,000
Material, Class C Steel
Treatment: Carburize in bone at 1500 F for 4 hours, then quench in oil

Another problem with single and double heat treat receivers is the low grade of the Class C and Class A materials used in single and double heat treat receivers. These materials are low strength and have a very low fatigue life compared to alloy steels. In every particular, these plain carbon steels are inferior to alloy steels. Watertown Arsenal was urging Springfield Armory to use 2340 instead of Class C steels prior to WW1, and the recommendations were ignored. Springfield Armory used this stuff primarily because it was cheap and the production engineers at Springfield Armory were familiar with the material. There is no justification for the continued use of these materials based on material properties. Today identical materials are used on rail road spikes and cheap rebar, because they are so low grade and cheap. No one in their right mind would use the same materials in a firearms application, unless they wanted to be sued. Plain carbon steels were commonly used on parts prior to WW2, but metallurgy in the 1920's and 30's advanced so quickly that by the time you get to WW2 it is obvious that plain carbon steels are only a good choice if cost is the number one criteria and the loads are not high or safety critical.

The American metallurgist Edgar Bain, http://www.nasonline.org/publication...in-edgar-c.pdf in 1932 published conclusive experiments on carbons steels. Bain heat treated identical plain carbon steel coupons under identical conditions and examined the coupons afterwards for hardness depth. The black chemical etching, which I assume is the unhardened steel, show that plain carbon steels have erratic hardening depths, given that all else is equal. These steels were called in WW2 era text books as “shallow hardening”. This was meant not as praise but as a pejorative. As is shown on the right of the diagram, the hardness of these coupons varies by depth. This is not good as consistent hardening provides consistent material properties. It is undesirable to create parts some of which will be hard through and through but others soft below the surface even though the heating processes are the same for all parts. But use plain carbon steels, and you will create such inconsistent parts, just by the nature of the material.






Therefore, you would expect even properly forged, properly heat treated single heat treat and double heat treat receivers to vary considerable in hardness depth, which then affects the properties of the end part.

Yield is an extremely important material property, for above yield, the part deforms. Once a steel part yields it is no longer safe to use. What happens after yield is unpredictable, often it takes less load to cause more deformation, ultimate load is the load it takes to break the part. In this early 1920’s chart, for the same essential heat treatment, the nickel alloy steel always has a higher yield, a significantly higher yield in all cases, than the plain carbon steel.


Nickel steel versus plain carbon steel




What is not shown in these charts is a material property called toughness. For a device, such as a receiver, which is going to be subjected to impact loading, toughness is a highly desirable property. Toughness is directly related to fatigue lifetime, which is the number of loading cycles to failure. Assuming the yield is sufficient for the load, the tougher material will have a longer service life. Alloy steels have a greater toughness than plain carbon steels. Alloy steels take more energy to shear, Charpy impact tests are a direct predictor of a steel’s fatigue lifetime. It is a revelation to see just how shear energy decreases with temperature, and at low temperature, alloy steels take several times the energy to shear as do plain carbon steels.

Pryometric cones have been around since the 1800’s, but I have no idea if they were used at Springfield Arsenal or even in the steel mills of the period. I don’t know if anyone reading this understands vacuum tube technology, late vacuum tube technology was much better than early vacuum tube technology, and no vacuum tube technology meant process controls depended on sight, taste, touch, and smell. These early M1903’s are pre vacuum tube technology. Human sensory perceptions have their limits and processes governed by them are not going to be very exact or repeatable. You see this in every evaluation of the steels of the period. This is an excellent example of what I find when someone reports a technical analysis of WW1 era steels:

Rolling Block strenght
http://castboolits.gunloads.com/show...strenght/page2

I did not know this until I looked as a response to your post. However, I have worked with Steel my entire professional career. I was the head of a Testing Lab in a steel manufacturing facility for 4+ years. During that time, I was provided a ferrule from a WW1 fighter airplane for testing. It was made from what was labeled "high strength steel" (the label was from WW1). I tested it and found that it was lower strength than the lowest strength steel that can be bought today. In addition, it had a lot more impurities than would be allowed today, particularly sulfer. (PS. "today" means from about 1975 to 1980). I know that steel has continued to increase since then in strength, ductility, and all the other desireable characteristics we use without thinking about it.

Therefore, old single heat treat receivers are a very significant unknown quantity. We know they were made in a factory that did not have temperature controls, we know that the material varies considerably in properties after heat treatment, and that the service life of the part will always be less to one made out of a good alloy steel. We also know the steels of the period were inferior in material properties to the exact same compositions made today, just due to the process controls of the period. Just how many service lives have these old receivers been though? How many more load cycles will they take before failure? How will they react in an overpressure situation?

Therefore, regardless of the hoopla around double heat treat receivers, “old world craftsmanship”, or the romantic feelings and emotions of those who believe the past was a better place, these old plain carbon steels are inferior in all aspects to alloy steels. It is my opinion that a combination of false economy and just reluctance to change by the Chief Metallurgist is why Springfield Armory kept using plain carbon steels even when early in the 20th century, it was obvious that these steels were rapidly becoming obsolescent, and by the 1920’s, they were obsolete for this application.


So, based on the unpredictability of these low number receivers, you just don't know how long it will be till something breaks. There were so many accidents that in 1927 an Army board looked at these things, reheated samples and found that 33 1/3% would break in an overpressure condition. The board recommended scrapping all 1,000,000 of the rifles, but because it was the cheaper solution, the Army decided to keep the rifles in service. It was cheaper to injure a Soldier, Sailor, or Marine than to replace the $40.00 rifle that injured the man. I don't know your feeling about this, but I consider this evil and unethical behavior. Any service man refusing to shoot this rifle, because of fears it might break, would be subject to a court marshal, but this is a moot point: they were not informed anyway. The Army never really went out and told anyone that their rifles were defective, we did not know the true extent of the problem until the Springfields were out of service, and Hatcher published his Book: Hatcher's Notebook in 1947!


The more I study this issue, the more I am disturbed to read the narratives from people whom the shooting community considers to an authority figure. Dr Lyons is one, he is a low number Springfield fan and by his analysis he is promoting risky behavior.

http://m1903.com/03rcvrfail/

Some Observations On The Failure Of U.S. Model 1903 Rifle Receivers

Dr Lyon’s risk analysis is solely based on the list in Hatcher’s Notebook. There are known low number blowups before Hatcher’s list starts, and there are known low number blowups after Hatcher’s database ends. Hatcher’s list is an incomplete list of low number accidents. It is really disturbing to realize that Dr Lyon is a medical Doctor (might be a reason 120,000 people die each year to medical mistakes) and to see that his analysis ignores underlying causes. Dr Lyon’s is not interested why these things break. His analysis is strictly on the numbers in a data base. For him, the characteristics of low number receivers are irrelevant. The technology of the era, the poor quality of the steel, the lack of process control technology, these are all ignored by Dr Lyon. It is as if low number failures have no assignable causes: the receivers just blow up randomly. No rime or reason to it, just acts of God, totally unknowable and unforeseeable. His statistics provide assurance to many that the risk of shooting a low number receiver is very small, but his analysis is very flawed . There are reasons beyond random chance why these receivers are structurally deficient.[/SIZE]

[Cosine26]

SLAMFIRE
You have provided an excellent analysis on the inferiority of the Class C Steel used in the production of early M1903 receivers and bolts and the inferior processes for heat treating the receivers and bolts of the SHT/LN carbon steel M1903 rifles; however I do not think that you have done much to dispel the "Don't bother me with facts, my mind is made up" mantra so prominent with the defenders of these early rifles.
One of the earliest analysis (not nearly so complete as yours) appeared in the Dope Bag of the American Rifleman for October of 1945. George Vitt an employee of A.F. Holden Co. ( one of the foremost heat treating companies of the time) Indicated that the carbon steel used in these products was inferior and was not suitable for such use. He further indicated that the DHT version was not much better than the reheated SHT receiver used by R.F. Sedgley. He does not address the "burned" steel receivers.
In 1996 an article (by the University of Missouri-Rolla) discussing the properties of the early 20th century carbon steel was discussed and in great detail explained the short comings of the processes. This discussion was based upon analysis of the then (circa 1996) carbon steel and a comparison with steel examples taken from the RMS TITANC. There were many shortcomings and the TITANIC steel post dated the Class C steel used in the carbons steel M1903 components.
Many of the paragons of knowledge of firearms in the 20's and 30's ( Crossman and Whelan) decried any disparaging remarks concerning these early rifles. Col Whelan on many occasions recommended having a SHT/LN receiver re-heatreated by Sedgley when a barrel replacement was necessary, for Springfield Armory refused to rebarrel these actions. This despite the fact, that SA would replace the SHT/LN receivers free of charge. Col Whelan recommended that a writer who had one of the early M1922 gallery rifles,sent this action to Sedgley for re-heatreating and rebarreling to 30-06. As a matter of fact, SA early on would replace the bolts also but stopped doing this for many owners objected. SA then adopted the policy of replacing bolts on if requested to do so. The notice appeared an early AR, but I have been unable to find the article. I know that some will dispute this, but one day I shall find the article and post it.
As an added point, some of these actions have been in use many years. Perhaps a weak spot existed and was continually stressed until failure occurred. I have had a DHT action fail, never catastrophically, but a failure. I have not had a failure of a NS M1903 action.
Thanks for your analysis.

[chuckindenver]

NS, steel failure.. rifle did survive

[Cosine26]

http://s116.photobucket.com/user/Cos...brary/M1917Rem (Click on picture to enlarge)
Here is a picture of a Remington M1917 that I blew up because of a hand loading error. After the stuck case was removed, the rifle head spaced OK and there was no damage to the receiver or the bolt.
I was using what I thought was IMR 4350 but it turned out to be IMR 4064 (taken from an unlabeled can) Load was 54 grains of powder behind a 190 grain bullet. Big mistake! My only injury was the black mark on my face as I was wearing industrial grade safety glasses. For what it is worth bullet hit was a low V @ 6 o'clock at 1000 yards. Poor consolation. Nickel steel action and bolt held.
FWIW

[slamfire]

You have provided an excellent analysis on the inferiority of the Class C Steel used in the production of early M1903 receivers and bolts and the inferior processes for heat treating the receivers and bolts of the SHT/LN carbon steel M1903 rifles; however I do not think that you have done much to dispel the "Don't bother me with facts, my mind is made up" mantra so prominent with the defenders of these early rifles.

Thanks for the nice words and support. We must team together to fight ignorance and superstition. It is a never ending fight as every day a wise man dies, but every second an ignorant baby is born.

In 1996 an article (by the University of Missouri-Rolla) discussing the properties of the early 20th century carbon steel was discussed and in great detail explained the short comings of the processes. This discussion was based upon analysis of the then (circa 1996) carbon steel and a comparison with steel examples taken from the RMS TITANC. There were many shortcomings and the TITANIC steel post dated the Class C steel used in the carbons steel M1903 components.

Can you provide more specific information so I can look up this article. Title, author, date?

Many of the paragons of knowledge of firearms in the 20's and 30's ( Crossman and Whelan) decried any disparaging remarks concerning these early rifles. Col Whelan on many occasions recommended having a SHT/LN receiver re-heatreated by Sedgley when a barrel replacement was necessary, for Springfield Armory refused to rebarrel these actions. This despite the fact, that SA would replace the SHT/LN receivers free of charge. Col Whelan recommended that a writer who had one of the early M1922 gallery rifles,sent this action to Sedgley for re-heatreating and rebarreling to 30-06. As a matter of fact, SA early on would replace the bolts also but stopped doing this for many owners objected. SA then adopted the policy of replacing bolts on if requested to do so. The notice appeared an early AR, but I have been unable to find the article. I know that some will dispute this, but one day I shall find the article and post it.

As you have noted, these gunwriters were anything but objective. They became brand names through their association with US Army Ordnance Department. They are always promoting themselves and their value to the public is based on their association with the Army Ordnance Department.



This is an article similar to what you were referring to:

American Rifleman Dope Bag August 1932

Sedgley Sporter Receivers are Strong

I have a Hornet rifle sold by Sedgley. The bolt and receiver have been taken from a Springfield rifle numbered between 300,000 and 400,000. It is my understanding that Springfield receivers numbered below about 800,000 are very brittle. Please let me know whether in your opinion it would be worth while to have this receiver changed to a more modern one.

I would appreciate it if you can give any information as to about what size group should be expected from this rifle at 100 and 200 yards –H.L.H.


answer: It would not be advisable to change the receiver of your Sedgley Hornet rifle to the modern type of Springfield receiver as the expense this would involve would not be warranted by the benefit derived from the change. You will find your Sedgley receiver strong enough even in the .30-’06 caliber, as Sedgley heat treats these rebuilt receivers with his own process, and proof-fires them with cartridges giving 90,000 pounds pressure. Of course in you Hornet caliber your pressures never exceed 45,000 pounds at the most, and have a normal mean considerably less than that with factory ammunition.

With a Springfield rifle, it would be different as the receiver could be changed at a small expense at the Springfield Armory. In case you have a Rock Island Springfield of serial number below 285,000 or a Springfield Armory with serial number under 800,000, it has the old “brittle” type of receiver. When sending such a weapon into the Armory for a new barrel, the receiver will be changed to the new modern heat-treated type without extra charge. All arrangements for barrel work, or receiver exchange, must be made directly through the D.C.M. office.

I would say that with your Sedgley Hornet your could expect 4” groups at 200 yards with good sights and from good rest, and of course this would imply 2” groups of smaller at 100 yards.

If you notice, the Army author is warranting the quality of the Sedgley heat treatment. What the heck does he know other than what he has been told by Sedgley?. This shows the conflicts of interest Gunwriters have, be they Army or Civilian. They are always looking for free bees from manufacturer’s, are always looking for future commissions, and the magazine wants the ad revenue. Basically, they are sock puppets, repeating what they told by a Corporate Advertising Bureau. This also shows the incompetence of the author. Here, in this 1932 article, the writer spreads the fiction that burnt receivers can be reheat treated back to goodness.

Burnt metal can no more be made good through reheat treatment, than can burnt toast be made new by re toasting. Once steel is overheated, it is permanently ruined.

Incidentally, in this 1945 article, even though they won’t reveal just who is that “outfit in Philadelphia”, they confirm that all that Sedgley was doing was annealing single heat treat receivers. This removed all hardness and in time, the head space would increase, and cartridges would blow. The so called Sedgley heat treat was a sham. The 1932 author is proven to be a sock puppet with the hand of the Sedgley Corporation inserted up his ass and flapping his jaw. Sedgley did not make things better, they made things worse!


American Rifleman Dope Bag Oct 1945

“All old Springfields Weak”


A long letter written by gunsmith, R.E Simmons to Mr Ness, the editor of the Dope Bag, describes a SHT Springfield that had blown. This section was about midway:

:
“I just received a letter from George Vitt of the A. F. Holden Company. This company is one of the foremost heat-treaters in the United States and he says that they will not even think of accepting one of these old actions for reheat-treating. To quote him:

“The old Springfield receivers were made of cheap, almost plain, carbon steel, that was merely carburized and quenched. The type of steel used would not readily lend itself to good results from the best heat-treating practices, even though there are one or two outfits in Pennsylvania and elsewhere (Note: Sedgley was in Philadelphia) who advertise the so called reheat-treated Springfields for sale I would no more trust these receivers without making a chemical analysis and without testing them on the Rockwell machine that I would jump off the Empire State Building.

From the references I have, the reheat-treatment of these receivers amounts to the same thing as the so called double heat treatment that was practiced at the Springfield Armory prior to 1929 In other works neither of the two is much good for the reason of low-grade material used in the receiver” (End of Mr. Vitt’s quote)”

Mr Simmons, in a bridging section in his letter, states he had worked in the Ordnance Department during WW2 and that he had tested SHT receivers after rebuild with proof loads and Mr Simmons had not seen any break, making him skeptical about these receivers being structurally deficient, but he states

“it is best not to recommend these old actions for any of the more powerful loads”


“Incidentally, I noticed that you mention a well-known reheat job which is being done on these Springfield receivers by a well known firm. I wish to state that many of these old actions treated by this firm (which is like the one I sent you), are letting go in every direction. In fact, I personally believe these are about the worst in the bunch, because they simply softened the receivers, which would allow a very powerful proof load to be fired without any danger, but which allowed the bolt to gradually set back, increasing the head space dangerously.

Mr Ness, the editor of the Dope Bag adds a long section starting with this

“Comments: I agree with P.O. Ackley that the only good Springfield action is one made of nickel steel….

The attitude of the metallurgists is that the poor material in these Springfield actions makes any of the carbon steel variety undesirable, including those double reheat-treated at Springfield Armory in the series above 800,000.”

Ness was a book writer and had an independent income separate from the American Rifleman and did not need free bees from Sedgley.

The practice that Sedgley followed of annealing single heat treat receivers was verified in the May-June 1985 Rifle Magazine in an article titled : About Low number Springfields, Sedgley's and others The author was Hugh Douglas. Hugh talked to a Sedgley employee decades after Sedgley went out of business. The employee verified the statements in the 1945 Dobe Bag. Sedgley bought lots of rejected low number receivers and simply annealed the things. The "proof load" was a greased standard ball cartridge. If the receiver developed headspace during the "proof test", the barrel was removed, an extra thread cut, and an additional extractor cut 180 degrees from the original.

Notice too, that the only criticism of the US Ordnance Department is during the War years. I cannot find an article critical of the US Army Ordnance Department before or after WW2. After WW2 Gen Hatcher retired from the Army and took the reins of the National Rifle Association. Except for a brief period during WW2, until 1968, the NRA acted as a quasi Governmental organization. In 1968 the US Army repudiated the NRA and kicked it out of the Pentagon. If you notice, the NRA had a headquarter near the Pentagon, but once the military services repudiated the organization during the Vietnam War, the property was sold. Closeness was great for lobbying their buddies in the Pentagon, but once the cash dried up and their contacts went away, physical closeness did not bring financial remuneration from the Armed Services. Quite literally the advocates of aimed fire and the M14 became persona non grata during the McNamara years. However the property was extremely valuable, due to closeness to the Pentagon, and it was sold.

[Cosine26]

SLAMFIRE
I believe that this is the url of the article:

http://www.tms.org/pubs/journals/jom...kins-9801.html
I failed to copy the original url but believe that this covers the essentials.
Those are not the examples that I remember but are close enough. Thee were many articles in the Dope Bag under Whelan that recommended Sedgley re heat SHT 03's. What really got to me was when he recommended that an early M1903 Gallery .22 (these were built on rejected M1903 receivers)[ maybe even a Hoffer-Thompson rifle] be sent to Sedgley for re heating and conversion to 30-06.
My experience with the M1917 described above convinces me that only the NS M1903's should be used with the heavy target loads. I am on the third barrel with my NS M1903 with no problems and I used in heavily in HP competition before converting to the M70.
FWIW