Buying a M1903

[Merc]

J,

Knowing the history behind our old guns makes owning them a lot more interesting.

What's really interesting to me was how the US entered WW1 in April, 1917 but the Ordinance Dept. withheld all of the M1917 production in 1917 from the war. This meant more than 400,000 M1917s stayed home because of parts interchangeability issues. They finally allowed M1917s to be sent to war in March, 1918 and only allowed those made after January, 1918 to go. The M1903 and was their only choice to arm the doughboys for the first 11 months of the war.

Merc

[firstflabn]

This meant more than 400,000 M1917s stayed home because of parts interchangeability issues...The M1903 and was their only choice to arm the doughboys for the first 11 months of the war.
Merc

It didn't matter. Shipping space, not rifles, was the primary constraint in the first year. The AEF reported that by 31 Dec 17, 183,896 men had arrived in Europe. The rule of thumb in WWI was that a balanced force required one rifle for every two men for initial issuance. Thus, the available trained force (using that term loosely) in Europe on New Years Day in 1918 could have gotten by on 100k rifles. You might recall that the Army had about 600k M1903s at the declaration of war in Apr.

On 31 Mar 18, the AEF reported 329,005 men had arrived. Of these, an estimated 107,000 were noncombatants. The buildup didn't gather speed until May. By then, the interchangeability issue had been resolved (and you overstated the scope of the problem).

Best I can tell, the 82nd Division was the second National Army division to arrive in Europe (the 77th got there in mid-Apr). The 82nd Division reached full strength on 30 Nov 17. They received their M1917s at the beginning of Feb - that's two whole months. Considering most were raw recruits, two months was barely enough time to begin making soldiers of them. Wooden rifles upset the press, but had no effect on the entry of US troops into combat.

It was six weeks after the arrival of the lead elements of the 82nd before the division was complete on the ground in Britain - shipping priorities. Then another two months of field training with experienced British and French troops. Not until 25 Jun did elements of the 82nd enter the line. There's your 11 months - the division had been organized on 5 Aug 17.

[Merc]

It didn't matter. Shipping space, not rifles, was the primary constraint in the first year. The AEF reported that by 31 Dec 17, 183,896 men had arrived in Europe. The rule of thumb in WWI was that a balanced force required one rifle for every two men for initial issuance. Thus, the available trained force (using that term loosely) in Europe on New Years Day in 1918 could have gotten by on 100k rifles. You might recall that the Army had about 600k M1903s at the declaration of war in Apr.

On 31 Mar 18, the AEF reported 329,005 men had arrived. Of these, an estimated 107,000 were noncombatants. The buildup didn't gather speed until May. By then, the interchangeability issue had been resolved (and you overstated the scope of the problem).

Best I can tell, the 82nd Division was the second National Army division to arrive in Europe (the 77th got there in mid-Apr). The 82nd Division reached full strength on 30 Nov 17. They received their M1917s at the beginning of Feb - that's two whole months. Considering most were raw recruits, two months was barely enough time to begin making soldiers of them. Wooden rifles upset the press, but had no effect on the entry of US troops into combat.

It was six weeks after the arrival of the lead elements of the 82nd before the division was complete on the ground in Britain - shipping priorities. Then another two months of field training with experienced British and French troops. Not until 25 Jun did elements of the 82nd enter the line. There's your 11 months - the division had been organized on 5 Aug 17.

That's an excellent description of the early US troop deployment in WW1. Thanks for sharing your knowledge.

Merc

[firstflabn]

That's an excellent description of the early US troop deployment in WW1. Thanks for sharing your knowledge.
Merc

I'm trying to get this WWI stuff figured out. The twists and turns that occurred after the totally unprepared US came up with a pretty logical plan to build an army for the European war fascinate me. Resisting Brit and French political pressure to send replacements for their forces instead of organizing an independent American army; losing the potential to produce 100k '03s during the receiver problem; the early phases of the Spanish Flu; the German 1918 spring offensive facilitated by the collapse of Russia late in 1917. That's plenty to upset the soundest plan. If are willing to endure it, here's one more thought on the beancount front:

I have no objection to the one third '03s, two thirds '17s broad estimate on quantities in Europe. It's misleading though. First try a hypothetical: say the entire US effort had consisted of 10 '03s carried to the war in June 1917 and 20 '17s carried over in June 1918. Further assume this hypothetical war also ended in Nov 18. If you said that 90% of the rifles used in the war were '17s, you would be mathematically correct - but would it tell an accurate story of the relative contributions of the two types? In this example, the '03s had 170 rifle-months service while the '17s had only 100 rifle-months. Length of service is at least as important as gross numbers.

While I would love to tell you I had detailed ammo expenditure data by divisions, I don't. So, let's look for another proxy for combat use.

About 42 divisions went to France. I have an army report that shows "Days spent by each division in quiet and active sectors." Only 29 divisions went "into the line." Some others were broken up for reinforcements and some just got there in the waning days of the war and never made it to the front. Anyway, of these 29 divisions, only 10 are National Army - this one third are the units with '17s (there are some exceptions, but this is a very broad gauge, so humor me).

I can't locate the accompanying notes to this chart, but the quiet and active day counts appear to exclude training with the Brits and French. (I never said it was a perfect proxy). So, of the 1,329 quiet days at the front, NA divisions had only 330 (about 25%). Of 905 active days at the front, NA divisions only had 187 (about 20%). That's a good bit short of the two thirds indicated by quantities alone.

Let's look at one other proxy - casualties. Regular Army and National Guard divisions - the ones with '03s (again with some exceptions) suffered two thirds of the casualties among divisions, while the NA divisions only had one third.

So, by these two imperfect proxies - days at the front and casualties - '03s saw from 66-80% of the action in Europe. M1917s would have played a major role had the war continued into the spring of 1919 and the amazing quantities produced made planning for the 1919 spring offensive possible, but in light of their very late appearance in France, it's hard to see how most of the '17s did much more than take two boat rides.